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Insurer's Wrongful Refusal to Settle:
A Note on Excess
INTRODUCTION

The typical liability insurance policy reserves in the insurer
the exclusive right to defend in any action on the policy, including the right to investigate, negotiate, and settle any claim or
suit against the insured.' By entering into the policy, the insured
has surrendered a valuable right, that of conducting an investigation and considering possible offers for settlement. 2 The contract gives the insurer complete discretion with regard to an
action brought against the insured. 3 Based on the duties created
by the policy, a non-contractual, fiduciary relationship arises, so
that the insurer and the insured owe to each other the duty to
4
exercise the utmost good faith.
When the insured is sued for an amount in excess of the limits
of the liability insurance policy, the insurance company has its

1. The typical liability insurance policy contains the following language:
[Tihe company shall:
(a) defend any suit against the insured alleging such injury, sickness, disease or
destruction and seeking damages on account thereof, even if such suit is
groundless, false or fraudulent; but the company may make such investigation
negotiation and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient.
Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1136,
1137 n.1 (1954).
Even if there is no express term in the policy giving the insurer the right to investigate
and settle, the clause requiring the insurer to defend naturally encompasses investigation
and negotiation of any settlement prior to trial. Cooley v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 52 Mich.
App. 612, 218 N.W.2d 103 (1974).
The exclusive right of the insurer to defend is not without public policy considerations.
Insurance is a regulated industry clothed in the public interest. Large sums of money are
involved, supported by insurance premiums paid by the public. The insurer has exclusive
control over the litigation against the insured, who is required to surrender to the insurer
all the control of the defense in order to insure an orderly and proper disbursement of
these funds and to minimize unwarranted claims. 7C J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW &
PRACTICE 2 (1979).
2. 7C J. APPLEMAN, supra note 1, at 512.
3. Keeton, supra note 1, at 1142.
4. Ballard v. Citizens Casualty Co., 196 F.2d 96, 102 (7th Cir. 1952) (applying Illinois
law) (citing American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. G.A. Nichols Co., 173 F.2d 830 (10th Cir.
1949)).
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own interests as well as those of the insured to protect. 5 The
insurer's goal is to dispose of the claim as inexpensively as it
can; the insured usually desires a settlement within or at the policy limits so that he will not be exposed to any personal liability.
The claimant 6 generally desires to settle for the policy limits,
preferring that certainty to the risk of trial and the possibility of
having to enforce an excess judgment against a possibly insolvent
7
insured.
The typical liability insurance policy covers the insured up to
the policy limits.8 If a larger verdict is returned against the
insured, the insured will be forced to pay all sums in excess of
the policy coverage. 9 A suit for wrongful refusal to settle10 is a
separate suit brought by the insured, the claimant, or an assignee of the insured1 1 against the insurer after an excess judgment

5.
6.

Keeton, supra note 1, at 1142.
For purposes of this note, "insurer" refers to the insured's liability carrier, "insured"

refers to the party with insurance who is being sued, and "claimant" refers to the individual who brought the original cause of action against the insured.
7. The overwhelming majority of cases are settled. A 1959 study of New York personal
injury litigation notes that 98% of the cases are disposed of through negotiation without
direct judicial intervention. Franklin, Chenin, & Mark, Accidents, Money and the Law: A
Study of the Economics of PersonalInjury Litigation,61 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 32 (1961). See
also 1 ALL-INDUSTRY RESEARCH ADVISORY COMMITTEE, AUTOMIBILE INJURIES AND THEIR
COMPENSATION IN THE UNITED STATES 14 (1979) (indicating that, on the average, 20% of all
bodily injury claims produce lawsuits, 1.5% go to trial, and 0.9% proceed to judgment).
8. The typical liability insurance policy contains the following:
As respects the insurance afforded by the other terms of this policy . .. the

company shall:
(c) pay all expenses incurred by the company, all costs taxed against the
insured in any such suit and all interest accruing after entry of judgment until
the company has paid, tendered or deposited in court such part of such judgment as does not exceed the limit of the company's liability thereon.
Keeton, supra note 1, at 1137 n.1.
9. "The claimant may still collect what he can, in excess of the policy, on his judgment against the insured." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTs 557 (4th ed.
1971).

10. The designation "wrongful refusal to settle" is used throughout this note to identify the cause of action that alleges insurer liability for refusing to settle within policy
limits. "Wrongful failure to settle" and "bad-faith suit" are sometimes utilized by courts
and commentators to signify wrongful refusal to settle. See, e.g., Roundtree v. Barringer,
92 Ill. App. 3d 903, 416 N.E.2d 675 (1981); Olympia Fields Country Club v. Banker's
Indem. Ins. Co., 325 Ill. App. 649, 60 N.E.2d 896 (1945); Note, Liability Insurers and
Third-PartyClaimants: The Limits of Duty, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 124 (1981); Comment, The
Dynamics of Change to a Strict Liability Rule in "Failureto Settle" Cases, 3 CONN. L.
REV. 539 (1971).

11.

The suit can be brought by the insured or by the claimant as assignee of the
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is rendered in the original action. Under this cause of action, the
insurer who has refused to settle may become liable for the entire

insured. In Brown v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 1 Ill. App. 3d 47, 272 N.E.2d 261
(1971), the court held that the cause of action is assignable after judgment. The court
stated that there are no valid public policy reasons why such a cause of action should not
be assignable. See also Browning v. Heritage Ins. Co., 33 Ill. App. 3d 943, 338 N.E.2d 912
(1975); Smiley v. Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co., 13 Ill. App. 3d 803, 301 N.E.2d 19 (1973).
Insurers rarely assert that an insured cannot assign a claim. See Annot., 12 A.L.R.3d
1158 (Supp. 1979). There is disagreement among Illinois courts, however, as to whether a
court can order the assignment of a claim. In Roundtree v. Barringer, 92 Ill. App. 3d 903,
416 N.E.2d 675 (1981), the court held that public policy precludes the involuntary assignment of a bad-faith claim. The court noted that the rationale typically advanced includes
the following: the judgment creditor has not been harmed but rather has benefitted from
the insurer's wrongful refusal to settle because it has received an excess judgment
against the judgment debtor; if involuntary assignment were allowed, the insured would
be deprived of his right to bargain with his judgment debtor for release of liability in
consideration of an assignment; and involuntary assignment would constitute a legally
enforceable form of champerty and encourage specious litigation because it would allow
the judgment creditor to go on a "fishing expedition." Id. at 905-06, 416 N.E.2d at 677.
This conclusion was rejected in Phelan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 114 Ill. App.
3d 96, 448 N.E.2d 579 (1983). The issue of involuntary assignability arose in a citation-todiscover-assets proceeding, which is governed by
2-1402 of the Illinois Code of Civil
Procedure, ILL REV. STAT. ch. 110, 2-1402 (1981). Paragraph 2-1402 allows the court to
"[c]ompel the judgment debtor to deliver up, to be applied in satisfaction of the judgment,
in whole or in part... choses in action.... Id. at 2-1402(b)(1). Phelanfound no limitation on the nature of the choses in action for which assignment may be compelled. Furthermore, the court found the mere possibility of collusive conduct on the part of the
injured party and the insured against the insurer to be an insufficient basis to deny a
right of action. In addition, an injured claimant can better determine whether an action
for wrongful refusal to settle may lie against an insurer because it is the claimant who
conducts the settlement negotiations with the insurer.
Illinois, like most jurisdictions, does not allow the claimant to bring an excess liability
suit directly where no assignment has been made. Scroggins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 74 Ill.
App. 3d 1027, 393 N.E.2d 718 (1979); Yelm v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 123 Ill. App. 2d 401,
259 N.E.2d 83 (1970) (notwithstanding his position as judgment creditor against the
insured, an injured party has no direct action against the insurer for breach of the duty to
the insured to exercise good faith or due care). Accord Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 17 Cal.
3d 937, 553 P.2d 584,132 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1976).
Scroggins points out that since no excess judgment has been rendered against the
insured, it is purely speculative whether the alleged breach of duty will ever result in the
injury that normally gives rise to an action for breach of that duty. Furthermore, potential difficulties, such as the possibility that insurers will be coerced into settling where
their liability has not and may never be established, outweigh the necessity of such an
action.
Some courts have recognized direct actions by judgment creditors. The first was the
California Supreme Court in Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592
P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979). In allowing direct action, the court relied on language
contained in the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act, CAL INS. CODE § 790.03(h)(5)
(West Supp. 1979), finding a vested right in the claimant to bring the cause of action.
Scroggins found no similar wording in the Illinois equivalent of the California act, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 73,
766.5-766.8 (1977).
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judgment, regardless of the policy limits. 12 The entry of that part
of the judgment against the insured which exceeds the policy
limits constitutes the damages the court will permit the insured
to recover. 13 It is the insurer's wrongful failure to settle rather
than the mere existence of the excess judgment which triggers
14
the cause of action.
The purpose of this note is to examine the cause of action for
wrongful refusal to settle in Illinois and to determine what type
of activity on the part of the insurer will expose it to excess liability. The valid reasons of the insurer for declining to settle within
the policy limits will be examined along with the insured's and
claimant's reasons for desiring settlement. This note will analyze
how the Illinois Appellate Court has balanced the parties' conflicting interests in the setting of the wrongful refusal to settle
suit by considering the recent Illinois cases of Adduci v. Vigilant
Insurance Co. 15 and Phelan v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. 1 6 This note will discuss the differing positions
that the Illinois Appellate Court has taken on the issue, examine
the public policy implications of the decisions, and suggest a
standard for Illinois courts to follow.

For a good discussion of the advisability of allowing direct actions, see Kranzush v.
Badger State Mut. Casualty Co., 103 Wis. 2d 56, 307 N.W.2d 256 (1981) (denying direct
action, over a strong dissent). See also Note, supra note 10, at 134-51; Note, Torts-Bad
Faith- Tort Victim Has No Cause of Action Against Tortfeasor's Insurer for Bad Faith
Failure to Settle the Victim's Claim, 65 MARQ. L. REv. 463 (1982); Annot., 63 A.L.R.3d 677
(1975).
It is not a condition precedent to recovery that the insured has paid or has the ability to
pay the excess judgment. Wolfberg v. Prudence Mut. Casualty Co., 98 111. App. 2d 190, 240
N.E.2d 176 (1968). Were payment or the ability to pay the rule, the insurer with an insolvent insured would be given encouragement to unreasonably refuse to settle, thus

severely impairing the use of insurance for the poor. See also Schwartz v. Norwich Union
Indem. Co., 212 Wis. 593, 250 N.W. 446 (1933) (to prevent the injustice of the insured being
required to pay a judgment that is arguably wrongfully imposed).
12. See Phelan,114 Ill. App. 3d at 102, 448 N.E.2d at 583; Scroggins, 74 Ill. App. 3d at
1030, 393 N.E.2d at 720; Cernocky v. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 69 Ill. App. 2d at 204, 216
N.E.2d at 203 (1966); Olympia Fields, 325 Ill. App. at 649, 60 N.E.2d at 895. See also
Keeton, supra note 1.
13. See Scroggins, 74 Ill. App. 3d at 1030, 393 N.E.2d at 720; Wolfberg, 98 Ill. App. 2d
at 197, 240 N.E.2d at 180.
14. Kavanaugh v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., 35 Ill. App. 3d at 356,342 N.E.2d at
121 (1975) (insurer's refusal to settle within policy limits does not render it liable per se for
the excess judgment to its insured); Browning v. Heritage Ins. Co., 33 Ill. App. 3d at 946,
338 N.E.2d at 915 (there is no precedent for a theory which would render the insurer liable
per se to its insured).
15. 98 Ill. App. 3d 472, 424 N.E.2d 645 (1981).
16. 114 Ill. App. 3d 96, 448 N.E.2d 579(1983).
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BACKGROUND

Origin of the Duty
Illinois first recognized a cause of action against an insurer for
wrongful refusal to settle within policy limits in Olympia Fields
Country Club v. Banker's Indemnity Insurance Co. 17 The court
allowed the insured to sue the insurer for the damages awarded
in excess of the policy limits where the evidence showed that the
injured claimant had offered to settle within policy limits after
the trial court awarded damages in excess of that amount.1 8
The Olympia Fields court struggled with whether the action
should sound in tort 19 or in contract,20 but did not clearly answer
this question. 21 The court did recognize a duty on the part of the
insurer arising from the contract, although the duty is not
expressed in the terms of the contract. 22 The scope of the duty

17. 325 Ill.
App. 649, 60 N.E.2d 895 (1945). In Olympia Fields the policy limit was
$10,000; the injured claimant offered to settle its claim for $3,500, but the insurer refused
to settle. After a $20,000 verdict for claimant at trial, claimant offered to settle for $8,000,
but the insurer again refused because it had appealed.
18. Id. at 670, 60 N.E.2d at 906. After the excess judgment was affirmed by the appellate court and the Illinois Supreme court denied an appeal, insurer paid to claimant
$10,815.80, the balance due her, and sued to recover that amount from insurer. Id. at 651,
60 N.E.2d at 897.
19. In jurisdictions holding that this cause of action sounds in tort, it is said that the
insurer has undertaken a duty to the insured to settle, under certain circumstances, by
insisting on controlling the defense of the insured and any settlement negotiations that
will bind it to pay. See, e.g., Zumwalt v. Utilities Ins. Co., 360 Mo. 362, 228 S.W.2d 750
(1950); Hart v. Republic Mut. Ins. Co., 152 Ohio St. 185, 87 N.E.2d 347 (1949); Came v.
Maryland Casualty Co., 208 Tenn. 403, 346 S.W.2d 259 (1961); Southern Fire & Casualty
Co. v. Norris, 35 Tenn. App. 657, 250 S.W.2d 785 (1952); Keeton, supra note 1, at 1138.
20. The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing forms the basis for the contract action. See McNulty v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 221 So. 2d 208 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App.),
cert. discharged,229 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1969); Gray v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 422 Pa. 500,
223 A.2d 8 (1968).
The majority opinion appears to hold that the cause of action sounds in tort. See Keeton, supra note 1, at 1138; Comment, 38 TEx. L. REV.233 (1959).
21. The court examined what other states had done and found disagreement as to the
nature and kind of proof necessary to make out a prima facie case of wrongful refusal to
settle against the insurer. The court did note, however, that "[a]ll of [the cases in the
sister states] acknowledge that an insurer may be liable for the entire judgment recovered
against an insured although the judgment exceeds the amount of liability in the policy if
the insurer be guilty of fraudulent conduct or a lack of good faith in refusing to settle."
325 Ill. App. at 660,60 N.E.2d at 901.
22. Olympia Fields quoted several cases, with apparent approval, which held that an
insurer's duty to act in good faith and to deal fairly with the insured flows from the
contract rather than from the specific terms of the contract. Id. at 649, 60 N.E.2d at 901.
The court quoted American Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Cooper. 61 F.2d 446 (5th Cir.
1932): "We are of the opinion that this relationship imposed upon the insurer the duty,
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does not turn on whether its breach is characterized as contractual or tortious, however, since in either event the duty itself
springs from the contractual relationship between the parties. 23
Consequently, most Illinois courts have since settled the issue
of the scope of duty without answering the question of whether
the action was in contract or in tort. 24 The current view in Illinois is that the right of the insured to recover from the insurer
for wrongful refusal to settle is an action in tort for breach of
duty owed by the insurer, the duty arising from the insurer's
exclusive contractual right to settle the claim. 25
Olympia Fields recognized that a duty on the part of the
insurer to act in good faith toward the insured's interests arises
when an injury occurs for which recovery may be had in a sum
exceeding the amount of insurance. 26 The duty arises because,

not under the terms of the contract strictly speaking, but because of and flowing from it,
to act honestly and in good faith toward the insured." 325 Ill. App. at 662, 60 N.W.2d at
901 (quoting American Mutual,61 F.2d at 448).
The Olympia Fields court also quoted Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 235
N.W. 413 (1930):
In express terms the contract imposes no duty at all a breach of which makes
the insurer liable to the insured for a failure to settle or compromise a claim.
However, all courts are agreed that the insurer does owe to the insured some
duty in this respect. This duty is implied as a correlative duty growing out of
certain rights and privileges which the contract confers upon the insurer.
325 Ill. App. at 669,60 N.W.2d at 904-05 (quoting Hilker, 204 Wis. at 14, 235 N.W. at 415).
23. Johansen v. California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau, 15 Cal. 3d 9, 18-19, 538
P.2d 744, 750, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288, 294 (1975).
24. Courts have had trouble expressing the origin of the duty. In Yelm v. Country
Mut. Ins. Co., 123 Ill. App. 2d at 404, 259 N.E.2d 84 (1970), the court recognized that
whether the duty arises in contract or in tort is a difficult question to resolve, but concluded that is usually unnecessary to so determine. In Brown v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 1 111. App. 3d 47, 272 N.E.2d 261 (1971), it was not clear whether the court was
proceeding under a contract or tort theory: "While the action may in aspect sound in tort,
it also arises out of the insurance contract. The duty to exercise good faith arises from the
contractual assumption of control of the litigation." Id. at 50-51, 272 N.E.2d at 264.
In Browning v. Heritage Ins. Co., 33 Ill. App. 3d 943, 338 N.E.2d 912 (1975), the court
proceeded under a tort theory. It held that the law raises a duty by the defendant to the
insured and that there is a breach of that duty when the insurer refuses to negotiate
when put on notice of excess liability. Id. at 948, 338 N.E.2d at 916.
An earlier view held by one commentator was that Olympia Fieldsheld that when the
excess judgment resulted from bad faith negotiations, the action should be on contract,
and when the judgment resulted from negotiations based on negligent investigation of
the facts surrounding the injury, the action should be in tort. See Note, Wrongful Refusal
to Settle by a Liability Insurer: The Standard for Illinois, 48 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 114, 115
(1971).

25.
26.

Browning v. Heritage Ins. Co., 33 Ill. App. 3d at 948, 338 N.E.2d at 916.
Olympia Fields, 325 Ill.
App. at 670, 60 N.E.2d at 905 (quoting Hilker, 204 Wis. at
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according to the express terms of the policy, the insured has bartered away all of his rights to discover the extent of the injury,
and the insurer has retained the exclusive right to settle the
claim. 27 The court held that, absent fraud, negligence, or bad
faith, an insurer cannot be held liable for refusing to settle a case
within policy limits, even though such refusal may result in a
judgment in excess of the policy limits. 28 Olympia Fields therefore established a check on the insurer by requiring that it give
some deference to its insured's interests.
Behavior By the Insured Constituting
Fraud,Negligence, or Bad Faith
Conflicting Interests
The policy behind the wrongful refusal to settle cause of action
is to allocate the costs of damages fairly when there is a judgment in excess of the policy limits. The main purposes of insurance are to protect the insured from sudden losses, to compensate the injured party, and to spread the costs of injury among
those people who benefit from accident-causing activities. 29 Balanced against these interests is the desire to keep the costs of
14, 235 N.W. at 414-16). The Hilker court applied agency law to hold against the insurer.
The company was the insured's agent because of the control it exercised over the defense
and settlement negotiations. The court held that the manner in which the insurer performed its agency violated its duty to its principal. Olympia Fields did not apply agency
analysis. Keeton, a well-known authority in the field of insurance law, states that the
insured should not be considered a principal because it is the insurer who makes the

decision to accept or reject settlement offers. Agency law is thus not properly analogous.
R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW § 7.10(b) (1971).

27. Olympia Fields, 325 Ill. App. at 673,60 N.E.2d at 905 (quoting Hilker, 204 Wisc. at
14, 235 N.W. at 414-16).
28. Olympia Fields, id., 60 N.E.2d at 906. The Olympia Fields court quoted Hilker as
follows:
It is the right of the insurer to exercise its own judgment upon the question of
whether the claim should be settled or contested. Its decision not to settle should
be an honest decision. If upon such consideration it decides that its interest will
be better promoted by contesting than by settling the claim, the insured must
abide by whatever consequences flow from that decision.
Id. at 670-71, 60 N.W.2d at 905 (quoting Hilker, 204 Wis. at 14, 235 N.W. at 416).
29. Liability insurance was originally intended solely for the benefit and protection of
the insured. W. PROSSER supra note 9, at 544. By its terms, liability insurance does not
provide compensation for injuries, but in most instances the injured party is compensated
where legal fault on the insured's part is proved. Id. at 557-58. In theory, an insured
defendant is not required to pay the compensation himself. His or her liability is distributed among a large group by insurance premiums. Id. at 569.
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insurance to the public as low as possible.30 Although these factors have not been discussed in most courts' decisions, they are
at least implicitly recognized in the courts' treatment of the cause
of action.
An injured claimant is normally eager to settle. He likely has
significant expenses; protracted litigation only serves to delay
his ability to take care of these expenses. 3 1 Furthermore, the
claimant runs the risk of not recovering at all should he lose.
The insured also desires to settle because a trial would expose
him to the risk of liability in the event of a judgment in excess of
the policy limits. 32 Furthermore, because of the high costs of litigation, settlement is also almost always economically preferable
33
to the insurer in cases where liability is likely.
Nevertheless, in some cases the insurer's interests may not be
furthered by settling. The insurer has institutional goals that
sometimes are adverse to the interests of the insured. 34 These

30.

If insurance premiums become prohibitive, the number who choose to do without

insurance will increase. Prosser states that the uninsured, as a group, are often the least
responsible financially and are unlikely to be able to pay a judgment. Id. at 557.
31.

J. MIRZA &J. APPLEMAN, ILLINOIS TORT LAw AND PRACTICE 362 (1974). The plaintiff is

most often on the "short side" of the settlement negotiations because of his immediate
need for compensation. In addition, lawsuits are usually one-time affairs for most plaintiffs. See also Phelan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 114 Ill. App. 3d 96, 448 N.E.2d
579 (1983) (the welfare of the claimant's family is important in determining whether the
negotiations were such that the insurer was relieved of liability for the judgment in
excess of the policy limits).
32.

See supra note 9.

33. Not suprisingly, the more a case is worth, the more likely it is to go to trial,
although once on trial, a large case is no more likely than a small one to persist to a
verdict. Rosenberg & Sovern, Delay and the Dynamics of PersonalInjury Litigation, 59
COLUM. L. REV. 1115, 1152 (1959).

Insurers will often pay off small amounts in order to protect against the possibility of
having to pay more in the event the injury becomes more serious later on. R. KEETON & J.
O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM 36 (1965).
The nuisance value of claims and the insurer's desire to maintain good public relations
are also factors that may explain the high frequency of settlements. See F.1 HARPER & F.
JAMES, TORTS 782 (1956). Cf. Pretzel, The Economics of Trial versus Settlement, 1965 INS.
LJ. 453, 460 (1965) (stating that more nuisance value cases should be tried).
Because the tort system generally requires a person to compensate another only if that
person is at fault and, given the fact that not everyone is insured, it is not surprising that
55% of those significantly injured in traffic accidents get absolutely nothing from the tort
liability system. 1 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF
AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT INJURIES 37-38 (1970). See also CONRAD, MORGAN, PRATT, VOZ, &
BOMBAUGH, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS: STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF

INJURY REPARATION 186 (1964) (stating that 45% of the seriously injured get no damage

recovery through the tort law system).
34. See Note, Excess Liability:Reconsideration of California'sBad Faith Negligence
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institutional goals are primarily economic.3 5 Any saving of
money by the insurance company is at least a partial saving in
premiums by the insurance-paying public. When the insurer
believes that the insured is not liable, it will almost certainly
choose to go to trial. 36 In addition, it may be more economical to
go to trial when the claimant's demand is too high. These are the
types of situations where the court will not find an insurer liable
37
even where there is an excess judgment.
It becomes a more difficult case where an insurer refuses to
settle even though the cost of litigation exceeds that of settlement. The insurer may do this in order to create a body of lowverdict or company-victory precedents which can be used as a
bargaining tool in later claims. 38 To establish this favorable
precedent, an insurer may choose to litigate regardless of the
reasonableness of settlement offers. The insurer is in a position
to take such action because it usually has the financial ability to
withstand protracted negotiations. 39 The claimant, on the other
hand, is often on the "short side" of the settlement negotiations,
40
because of immediate financial need.
The insurer's choice not to settle may still be in the public
interest in the sense that it has the effect of keeping the cost of
insurance premiums down. On the other hand, by exposing the
insured to potential liability, the insurer is not protecting him
from sudden losses. Furthermore, the overall societal goal of
adequately compensating the injured party is not served, because payment is substantially delayed by the pending litigation. Within this setting arises the action for wrongful refusal to
settle.

Rule, 18 STAN. L. REv. 475 (1966).
35. See Pretzel, supra note 33, at 460.
36. An insurer will occasionally settle even when it believes its insured is not liable
because of the nuisance value of claims and the insured's desire to maintain good public
relations. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMEs, supra note 33, at 782.
37. See, e.g., Olympia Fields, 325 Ill. App. at 672, 60 N.E.2d at 906 (The insurer has
the right to exercise its own judgment. The insured must abide by the consequences of the
insurer's good faith decision to either contest or settle the claim.).
38. Note, supra note 33, at 460.
39. Note, supra note 34, at 480.
40. See supra note 31. The greater the injury, the weaker the victim's bargaining position becomes and the less able he is to wait for the outcome of litigation. F. James,
Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance,57 YALE L.J. 549, 568

(1948).
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Protection of the Insured's Interests
Courts attempt to balance the conflicting interests of the
insured and the insurer by requiring the insurer to give some
consideration to the insured's interests during the settlement process. The trier of fact is required to make the determination of
41
liability or non-liability concerning wrongful refusal to settle.
Jurisdictions differ concerning the extent to which an insurer
must consider the insured's interests in relation to its own. Earlier cases often held that the insurer could give exclusive consideration to its own interests in evaluating the claim and conducting negotiations. 42 Some cases hold that the insurer must give
"some" consideration to the insured's interests. 43 It is most frequently held that an insurer must give equal consideration to
both interests, 44 although there is some support for the view that
the insurer is required to give the insured's interests paramount
45
consideration.
Illinois courts apply the equal consideration standard, 46 which,
because the insurance contract is silent concerning whose inter47
ests prevail, the courts believe treats the parties involved most fairly.

41. American Mut. Liability, 61 F.2d at 448 (5th Cir. 1932); DeGraw v. State Security
Ins. Co., 40 Ill. App. 3d 26, 37, 351 N.E. 2d 302, 310 (1976); Olympia Fields, 325 Ill. App. at
656, 60 N.E.2d at 899; 7C J. APPLEMAN, supra note 2, at 502.
42. See Kleinschmit v. Farmers Mut. Hail Ins. Assoc., 101 F.2d 987 (8th Cir. 1939).(the
insurer is not required to accept even reasonable offers); Rumford Falls Paper Co. v.
Fidelity & Casualty Co., 92 Me. 574, 43 A. 503 (1899) (since the contract limits the liability
of the insurer to the policy limits, the insurer is never liable for anything in excess of that

limit).
43. See Automotive Mut. Indem. Co. v. Shaw, 134 Fla. 815, 184 So. 852 (1938);
Wynnewood Lumber Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 173 N.C. 269, 91 S.E. 946 (1917). In the
absence of language to the contrary, all decisions recognizing any liability in negligence
or in bad faith for wrongful refusal to settle can be construed to indicate that the insurer
must give at least some consideration to the insured's interests.
44. See Ballard v. Citizens Casualty Co., 196 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1952) (applying Illinois
law); Adduci v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 98 Ill. App. 3d 472, 424 N.E. 2d 645 (1981); Cernocky v.
Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am., 60 Ill. App. 2d 196, 216 N.E.2d 198 (1966).
45. Allstate Co. v. Keller, 17 Ill. App. 2d 44, 149 N.E.2d 482 (1958) (citing American
Employees Ins. Co. v. Goble Aircraft, 205 Misc. 1066, 131 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1954)); National
Mut. Casualty Co. v. Britt, 203 Okla. 175, 200 P.2d 407 (1948), reh'gdenied, 218 P.2d 1039
(1950).
46. Adduci, 98 Ill. App. 3d at 475,424 N.E.2d at 648; DeGraw, 40 111. App. 3d at 37, 351
N.E.2d at 311; Cernocky, 69 Ill. App. 2d at 207, 216 N.E.2d at 204; Olympia Fields,325 111.
App. at 671, 60 N.E.2d at 905; Scroggins, 74 Ill. App. 3d at 1029, 393 N.E.2d at 720.
47. Adduci, 98 Ill. App. 3d at 479, 424 N.E.2d at 650; Keeton, supra note 1, at 1145-46.
The equal consideration standard fairly treats both parties because each has voluntarily
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This standard restrains the insurer from proceeding solely on its
self-interest.18 Instead, while it may still properly give considera-.
tion to its own interests, it must also give at least equal consid49
eration to the interests of the insured.
Grounds for an Action for
Wrongful Refusal to Settle
Olympia Fields held that an insurer can be liable for the
amount in excess of the policy limits where there is "fraud, negligence or bad faith." 50 Although these terms have different
meanings, 5 1 the Olympia Fields court seemed to find little significant difference. 52 The result is that Illinois courts generally continue to use the Olympia Fields language, but it is used more as
53
a conclusory phrase than as a descriptive one.

entered into a contract that gives rise to a conflict of interests, but does not specify that
one interest or the other should prevail. Id. Cf. infra text accompanying notes 114-16.
48. Adduci, 98 Ill. App. 3d at 479, 424 N.E.2d at 650 (1981). Cf. infra text accompanying notes 140-43.
49. Ballard v. Citizens Casualty Co., 196 F.2d at 102 (7th Cir. 1952) (applying Illinois
law); Adduci, 98 Ill. App. 3d at 479, 424 N.E.2d at 650 (1981); Cernocky, 69 Ill. App. 2d at
207, 216 N.E.2d at 204 (1966).
50. Olympia Fields, 325 Ill. App. at 673,60 N.E.2d at 906.
51. In its general sense, "fraud" includes anything calculated to deceive. Illinois Fair
Plan Ass'n v. Astirs, Inc., 89 Ill. App. 3d 422, 411 N.E.2d 1050 (1979). "Negligence" has
been defined as want of ordinary or reasonable care. 65 C.J.S Negligence § 1(2) (1966).
"Every tort action grounded in negligence requires the showing of (1) a duty owed by the
defendant to the plaintiff, (2) a breach of that duty, i.e., a negligent act or omissions,
which (3) proximately cause a (4) resulting compensable injury." Browning v. Heritage
Ins. Co., 33 Ill. App. 3d at 948, 338 N.E.2d at 916. "Bad Faith" has been defined as
"actual intent to mislead or deceive another; fraud, the opposite of good faith." Economy
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Western States Mut. Ins. Co., 49 Ill. App. 2d 59, 64, 198 N.E. 2d
723, 726 (1964).
52. Olympia Fields, 325 Ill. App. at 669, 60 N.E.2d at 904. The court quotes, with
apparent approval, Hilker, which states:
Terms which are not strictly convertible or synonymous have been used by
different courts to indicate the same thing. Negligence has been used by some
courts to mean the same thing that other courts have designated as bad faith.
Bad faith, especially, is a term of variable significance and rather broad application. Generally speaking, good faith means being faithful to duty or one's
obligation; bad faith means being recreant thereto.
Id. at 669, 60 N.E.2d at 904 (quoting Hilker, 204 Wis. at 13, 235 N.W. at 414).
53. See, e.g., Phelan, 114 Ill. App. 3d at 104, 448 N.E.2d at 584-85 (plaintiff must show
breach of good faith in order to recover on a bad-faith claim); Cernocky, 69 Ill. App. 2d at
205-06, 216 N.E.2d at 203 ("good faith" and "bad faith" are not terms of art; they mean
being faithful or unfaithful to the duty that is owed); Olympia Fields, 325 111. App. at 669,
60 N.E.2d at 905 (good faith means being faithful to an obligation; bad faith means being
recreant to it).

524

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 15

Illinois courts generally do not require that the insured prove
fraud because such a standard would impose on the plaintiff an
almost impossible burden of proving the actual state of mind of
the insurer when it refused to accept a settlement. 54 Bad faith, in
the sense that the term contemplates a state of mind with an
affirmative design of wrongdoing, likewise is not the Illinois
standard. 55 It is often stated that the insurer must act in good
faith, 56 which means that where an insurer reasonably believes
it can win a lawsuit, a refusal to settle an action is not a breach
of its duty of good faith.5 7 Although Illinois courts have not been
entirely consistent in the language they have used in describing the standard, 58 allegations of fraud, negligence, or bad faith
are factual issues in which the trier of fact must determine
whether the insurer gave equal consideration to its own interests

54. Ballard, 196 F.2d at 100 (applying Illinois law); Cernocky, 69 Ill. App. 2d at 205,
216 N.E.2d at 203; Olympia Fields, 325 Ill. App. at 664, 60 N.E.2d at 902.
One Illinois court, however, has required specific facts of fraud to be set out in the
pleadings. Economy Fire & Casualty Co. v. Western States Mut. Ins. Co., 49 Ill. App. 2d
59, 198 N.E.2d 723 (1966).
55. General Casualty Co. v. Whipple, 328 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1964); Ballard v. Citizens
Casualty Co., 196 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1952).
56. Ballard, 196 F.2d at 102; Kavanaugh, 35 Ill. App. 3d at 356, 342 N.E.2d at 120;
Olympia Fields,325 111. App. at 674, 60 N.E.2d at 907. Kavanaughstated that because the
insurer owes the insured a fiduciary duty, it is therefore obligated to act in good faith.
The good faith standard, as it is used in wrongful refusal to settle cases, permits the
insurer to be less responsive to the fiducial obligation than is any other type of fiduciary.
Rova Farms Resort v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 323 A.2d 495 (1974).
57. 7C J. APPLEMAN, supra note 2, at 448.
58. In practice there is probably little distinction between the negligence and bad
faith standards because, with skillful advocacy for the insured, bad faith is the practical
equivalent of negligence. See 7C J. APPLEmAN, supra note 2, at 425; Keeton, supranote 1,
at 1140; Roos, A Note on the Excess Problem, 1952 INS. L.J. 192, 194.
Nevertheless, Illinois courts continue to use the terms in various manners. Some courts
have required proof of bad faith. See, e.g., Ballard v. Citizens Casualty Co., 196 F.2d 96
(7th Cir. 1952) (applying Illinois law); Brown v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 1 Ill. App.
3d 47, 272 N.E.2d 261 (1971). Other courts use negligence or bad faith. See, e.g., General
Casualty Co. v. Whipple, 328 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1964) (applying Illinois law); Kavanaugh
v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., 35 Ill. App. 3d 350, 342 N.E.2d 116 (1975). Others use
negligence and bad faith. See, e.g., Wolfberg, 98 Ill. App. 2d 190, 240 N.E.2d 176 (1968);
Cernocky, 69 Ill. App. 2d 196, 216 N.E.2d 198 (1966). Some use the Olympia Fields language allowing proof of fraud, negligence or bad faith. See, e.g., Adduci, 98 Ill. App. 3d
472, 424 N.E.2d 645 (1981); Scroggins, 74 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 393 N.E.2d 718 (1979); DeGraw
v. State Security Ins. Co., 40 Ill. App. 3d 26, 351 N.E.2d 302 (1976); Browning v. Heritage
Ins. Co., 33 Ill. App. 3d 943, 338 N.E.2d 912 (1975); Powell v. Prudence Mut. Casualty Co.,
88 Ill. App. 2d 343,232 N.E.2d 155 (1967).
Some jurisdictions hold that liability must be based on more than simple negligence.
Bad faith may involve negligence, or negligence may indicate bad faith, but negligence
alone is not sufficient to render the insurer liable. For a comprehensive discussion com-
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and the insured's interests in defending against the action.5 9
DEVELOPMENT OF ILLINOIS LAW

Insurer's Conduct
Courts have considered many factors in attempting to determine whether the insurer has given sufficient consideration to
the insured's interests.60 Illinois law does not demand that an
insurer settle within policy limits or invariably suffer the consequences of excess judgment. 61 The insurer generally has no duty

paring the negligence and bad faith standards, see Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal.
App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (1957).
It has been suggested that jurisdictions like Illinois which use both negligence and bad
faith do not include negligence within the concept of bad faith. Under this view, evidence
showing that the insurer had an opportunity to settle within policy limits, but never
offered more than a substantially lesser amount, together with the fact that the insurer
was aware of the serious nature and extent of injuries suffered by the claimant, is sufficient to make a case submissable to the jury. 7C J. APPLEMAN, supra note 1, at 519-20.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 46-49.
60. Some of the factors courts have considered are: (1) the strength of the injured
claimant's case on the issue of liability and damages; (2) attempts by the insurer to
induce the insured to contribute to a settlement; (3) failure of the insurer to properly
investigate the circumstances so as to ascertain the evidence against the insured; (4) the
insurer's rejection of the advice of its own attorney or agent; (5) the amount of financial
risk to which each party is exposed in the event of a refusal to settle; (6) the fault of the
insured in inducing the insurer's rejection of the compromise offer by misleading it as to
the facts; (7) the insurer's rejection of a compromise offer after an excess judgment had
been returned; (8) the existence of reinsurance protection held by the insurer; (9) the
insurer's advice to its insured to transfer its assets so as to be immune from an excess
judgment; (10) a statement by the insurer regarding the low limit as being an advantage
of the case; (11) deprecating statements made by the insurer about the minority or religious status of a party as being grounds for an unreasonably low evaluation; (12) evidence that the insurer favored risking a trial because the insured is judgment-proof: (13)
the insurer's rejection of a reasonable settlement offer because all the plaintiffs refused to
join; (14) the insurer's increasing its reserves after rejecting a settlement offer; (15) the
insurer establishing an arbitrary settlement figure below the policy limits; (16) the insurer's failure to have a representative at trial to increase the settlement offer if the trial
went badly; and (17) an indication of willingness to offer the full amount and then a
failure to do so by the insurer. The first six factors were mentioned in Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (1957). Factors seven through seventeen
were mentioned in Jarrett, Lawsuits for Wrongful Refusal to Defend or to Settle, 28 INS.
COUNS. J. 58,65 (1961).
61. Ballard v. Citizens Casualty Co., 196 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1952); Kavanaugh v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., 35 Ill. App. 3d 350, 342 N.E.2d 116 (1975) (insurer's refusal to
settle within policy limits does not render it liable per se to its insured).
Some courts have discussed holding the insurer strictly liable for damages in excess of
policy limits. See e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr.
13 (1967) (the court stopped short of applying strict liability, but noted several arguments

526

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 15

to initiate negotiations, 62 for to place such a duty on the insurer
would render it at a negotiating disadvantage. 63 An insurer is
not required to make a settlement offer where the claimants
make it clear that they will not accept such an offer. 64 On the
other hand, liability does not depend on a claimant making an
offer where the insurer refuses to discuss settlement. 65 Likewise,
no offer is required for liability where the insurer refuses to
inform the claimant of the policy limits so that he can determine
whether a settlement offer within the policy limits could be
made.66 Courts have held this conduct to indicate that the insurer
did not give equal consideration to the insured's interests. 67
The general rule in Illinois is that where the probability of an
adverse finding of liability is great and the amount of damages
would greatly exceed coverage, the insurer is liable for the excess
if the insurer has failed to settle within the policy limits.68 Thus,
one court found that an insurer acted in bad faith when it
failed to settle on four separate occasions, told the insured not to
retain private counsel, and failed to advise the insured of the
adverse verdict and the statutory time to appeal. 69 Likewise, in

favoring strict liability); Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 323
A.2d 495 (1974) (dicta). See also Schwartz, Statutory Strict Liability for an Insurer'sFailure to Settle: A Balanced Plan fo an Unresolved Problem, 1975 DuKE L.J. 901; Note, An
Insurance Company'sDuty to Settle, Qualified or Absolute? 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 120 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Insurance Company's Duty]; Note, supra note 34; Note, Insurer's Refusal to Settle - A Proposalfor Imposition of Liability Above Policy Limits, 60
YALE L.J. 1037 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Note, Insurer'sRefusal to Settle].
62. See Adduci v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 98 Ill. App. 3d 472, 424 N.E.2d 645 (1981); Haas v.
Mid-America Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 35 Ill. App. 3d 993, 343 N.E.2d 36 (1976); Kavanaugh v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., 35 111. App. 3d 350,342 N.E.2d 116 (1975); Powell
v. Prudence Mut. Casualty Co., 88 Ill. App, 2d 343, 232 N.E.2d 155 (1967).
63. See Oda v. Highway Ins. Co., 44 Ill. App. 2d 235,194 N.E.2d 489 (1963).
64. General Casualty Co. v. Whipple, 328 F.2d 353 (1964); Haas v. Mid-America Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 35 111. App. 3d 993,343 N.E.2d 302 (1976).
65. See Cernocky v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 69 Ill. App. 2d 196, 216 N.E.2d 198 (1966).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Kavanaugh v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., 35 Ill. App. 3d 350, 342 N.E.2d 116
(1975). The court stated this rule as an exception, apparently meaning that an insurer is
normally not liable for the excess judgment unless these conditions are met. In Adduci,
the court interpreted the Kavanaugh language to mean that if there is a strong probability of an excess judgment, the insurer is required to treat the insured's interests at least

equally with its own. 98 Ill. App. 3d at 472,424 N.E.2d at 645.
One commentator characterized the Kavanaughlanguage as meaning that the court is
imposing strict liability when the probability of an excess verdict is great and the probable damages would greatly exceed the available coverage. Haskell & Pope, The Insurer's
Conflict of InterestDilemma, 65 ILL B.J. 220, 224 (1976).
69. See Bailey v. Prudence Mut. Casualty Co., 429 F.2d 1388 (7th Cir. 1970).
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other cases, courts have found the insurer's failure to settle to be
negligent and in bad faith where the insured made numerous
demands on the insurer to accept an offer to settle within the
policy limits. 7 0 In each of these cases, the possibility of a favor-

71
able decision was minimal.
The Illinois Appellate Court, in Kavanaugh v. Interstate Fire
& Casualty Co., 72 reversed an award for wrongful refusal to settle. The case involved the Illinois Guest Statute, 73 which imposed
a lower standard of care on the insured, thereby favoring the
probability of success for the insured at trial. 74 The court held
that the insurer will not always be liable when a judgment in
excess of the policy limits is rendered. 75 The cause of action for
wrongful refusal to settle does not require trial attorneys to be
"endowed with the gift of prophecy so as to be able to predict the
precise outcome of personal injury litigation." 76 The court reversed the excess liability award because the issue of liability in
the original action was not so clear cut as to make the insurer's
77
liability sufficiently probable.
The Kavanaugh court required the insurer to settle within the
policy limits only if the probability of an adverse finding on liability is great and the amount of damages would greatly exceed
coverage. 78 By setting out this test, the court struck a balance
among the desire of the insured to settle within the policy limits,
the societal goal of compensating injured claimants as quickly
as possible, and the desire of the insurer to avoid paying damages.

Adduci and Phelan
Two recent Illinois cases illustrate different approaches to the
wrongful refusal to settle suit and the problems courts have had
in interpreting the Kavanaugh test. Both Adduci v. Vigilant In-

70. See Smiley v. Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co., 13 Il.App. 3d 809, 301 N.E.2d 19
(1973); Cernocky v. Indem. Ins. Co., 69 Ill.
App. 2d 196, 216 N.E.2d 198 (1966).
71. See Smiley, 13 Ill.
App. 3d at 813, 301 N.E.2d at 21; Cernocky, 69 Ill.
App. 2d at
203, 216 N.E.2d at 202.
72. 35 Ill.
App. 3d 350, 342 N.E.2d 116 (1975).
73. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 95=1/2, 10-201 (1981).
74. Kavanaugh,35 111. App. 3d at 357,342 N.E.2d at 121.
75. Id. at 356, 342 N.E.2d at 121.
76. Id. at 357, 342 N.E.2d at 121. For a criticism of the Kavanaugh result see
J. MIRZA & J. APPLEMAN, supra note 31, § 13.7 (Cure. Supp. 1983) (calling the decision

"ill-conceived").
77.

Kavanaugh, 35 111. App. 3d at 356, 342 N.E.2d at 121.

78. Id.
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surance Co.79 and Phelan v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co.8 0
involved instances where the insurer responded to the injured
claimant's offer and made a tender of the policy limits. In both
cases, however, the insurer tendered after the injured claimant's
81
deadline. The tender was then rejected.
The cause of action in Adduci arose out of a one-car accident
involving the insured and three injured claimants.8 2 One of the
claimants made an offer to settle at the policy limits, but the
insurer requested a discount.83 Later, all of the claimants made
an offer to settle at the policy limits, setting a twenty-eight day
85
deadline,8 4 but the insurer did not respond within the time limit.
Forty-four days after the offer had expired, the insurer offered to
pay the policy limits.86 The claimants declined the offer.8 7 Two
of the claimants settled; one went to trial and received a verdict
for $70,000, of which the insurer paid the policy limits. 88 The
claimant accepted an assignment from the insured to bring the
excess judgment action against the insurer.8 9
In the pleadings, the claimant asserted that the insurer was
aware that it would probably be held liable and had admitted that
the claimant's injuries alone were likely to exceed the policy limits.90 The appellete court held that the pleadings were sufficient

to create a duty upon the insurer to treat the insured's interest at
least equal to its own. 91 The pleadings stated that the claimant's
reason for refusing to accept the insurer's offer some forty-four
days after the claimant's deadline was that it had expended
additional effort in preparing for trial, thereby necessitating a

79. 98 Ill. App. 3d 472, 424 N.E.2d 645(1981).
80. 114 Ill. App. 3d 96, 448 N.E.2d 579(1983).
81. Phelan, 114 Ill. App. 3d at 99, 448 N.E.2d at 581; Adduci, 98 Ill. App. 3d at 474, 424
N.E.2d at 647.
82. Adduci, 98 11. App. 3d at 474, 424 N.E.2d at 647.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 475, 424 N.E.2d at 647.
87. Id.
88. Id. After the first two claimants settled, $17,500 of coverage remained. After the
insurer tendered this amount, there remained an unpaid balance of $52,500.
89. Typically, excess judgment suits are brought by the original claimant as assignee
of the insured. See supra note 11 for a discussion on the nature and validity of the
assignment.
90. Adduci, 98 Ill. App. 3d at 474, 424 N.E.2d at 647. The policy in question had a
$25,000 single bodily injury liability limit.
91. Id.
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different fee arangement. 92 The court held, however, that even if
the allegations in the complaint were proved, the claimant would
not be allowed to recover because there were no facts in the complaint sufficient to show why the offer was unacceptable to the
93
claimant.
The court in Phelan94 took a different view. In Phelan, the
claimant was rendered a quadriplegic when the insured's automobile struck the automobile in which the claimant was a pas96
senger. 95 The claimant offered to settle for the policy limits,
setting an expiration date for the offer; after that date, the claimant would move for trial. 97 After a counteroffer by the insurer
98
and further negotiations, no agreement had been reached.
One month after the claimant's deadline, the insurer expressed
concern that an excess judgment would be rendered and offered
the policy limits. 99 The claimant rejected this offer.1 00
The jury found for the insurer, but the appellate court reversed
and ordered a trial on the issue of damages. 10 1 The jury then
assessed damages at $350,000.102 The claimant received an
assignment of the insured's excess liability claim,1 0 3 and went to

92. Id. at 477, 424 N.E.2d at 649.
93. Id. The court gave controlling significance to the fact that the insured did respond
with an offer of the policy limits.
94. 114 Ill. App. 3d 96, 448 N.E.2d 579(1983).
95. Id. at 97, 448 N.E.2d at 580. A detailed account of the events leading up to the
accident is given in Phelan v. Santelli, 30 Ill. App. 3d 657, 659-62, 334 N.E.2d 391, 393-95
(1975).
96. Phelan, 114 Ill. App. 3d at 98, 448 N.E.2d at 580. The liability policy limits were
$100,000 per person and $200,000 per occurrence.
97. Id.
98. Insurer's claim committee gave its claim superintendent leave to authorize $100,000
for settlement. The claim superintendent instructed the insurer's attorney to offer only

$85,000 to the claimant. After insurer offered $85,000 to settle the case, the claimant's
attorney said that he would accept $97,500 for a covenant not to sue or $100,000 for a
release. Insurer held its offer firm at $85,000. Claimant rejected the offer and stated that
its offer would remain in effect until November 6, after which it would be necessary to
hire a trial specialist. The insurer refused to move on its offer of $85,000 and, after
November 6, the claimant hired a trial specialist. Id. at 98-99, 448 N.E. 2d at 581.
99. Id. at 99, 448 N.E.2d at 581.
100. Id.
101. Phelan v. Santelli, 30 Ill. App. 3d 657, 334 N.E.2d 391 (1975). The appellate court
ultimately held that the defense counsel's statements to the jury interpreting the meaning
of the court's instruction as to the law were manifestly misleading and may have influenced the erroneous jury finding and verdict.
102. Phelan,114 Ill. App. 3d at 100, 448 N.E.2d at 581. Prior to the beginning of trial
on damages, insurer again attempted to settle with claimants for the policy limits.
103. See supra note 11.
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trial on the excess liability issue, in which the jury rendered a
verdict of $250,000 against the insurer. 10 4 The trial court then
10 5
entered a judgment n.o.v. in favor of the insurer.
The appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment n.o.v.
and reinstated the jury verdict 0 6 because it appeared that the
insurer was aware that damages would be in excess of policy
limits, since the claimant was a quadriplegic with little or no
chance of recovery' 0 7 and the insurer's claim superintendent
believed that a jury would find the insured negligent. 08 The
appellate court upheld the jury verdict for wrongful refusal to
settle based on the evidence at trial which showed the necessity
of the claimant's attorney procuring the services of a trial attorney, the added expenses incurred in preparation for trial, and
concern for the welfare of the claimant's family. 0 9 The court followed the Kavanaugh language, stating that in this situation
the insurer must settle within the policy limits or face an excess
liability claim for breach of duty of good faith owed to the
insured. 1' 0
The Adduci and Phelan courts considered remarkably similar
fact situations in that both involved instances where the probability of an adverse finding on the issue of liability was great,
the amount of probable damages greatly exceeded coverage, and
the time of the insurers' offers came after negotiations had ended."' Since the results were opposite, Illinois courts may have

104. Phelan, 114 Ill. App. 3d at 100, 448 N.E.2d at 580.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 98, 448 N.E.2d at 580.
107. Id. at 105, 448 N.E.2d at 585. At the original trial, plaintiffs physician testified
that plaintiff would require continuous lifetime care by a licensed practical nurse and
that plaintiff would, from time to time, require hospitalization and professional observation because of her susceptibility to infection. Phelan v. Santelli, 30 Ill. App. 3d 657, 334
N.E.2d 391 (1975).
108. Phelan, 114 Ill. App. 3d at 98, 448 N.E.2d at 580. The field representative of the
insurer felt that the insured had little regard for safety when he backed up his automobile
on a highway at the base of a hill.
109. Id. at 104, 448 N.E.2d at 585. This evidence is significant in that it shows that the

claimant did not unreasonably refuse the insurer's settlement offer.
110. Id. The court stated: "Where it appears that the probability of an adverse finding
is great and the amount of damages would exceed the policy limits, the insurer has a
duty to settle within the policy limits or face an excess liability claim for the breach of the
duty owed to the insured." Id.
111. The Phelan court found Adduci to be distinguishable. The Phelan court stated
that the instant case submitted the issue of the insurer's wrongful refusal to settle to the
jury. This allowed the jury to conclude that the insurer breached its duty to the insured in
failing to settle with the claimant. Id., 448 N.E.2d at 584. In Phelan the evidence
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difficulty determining the proper grounds for wrongful refusal to
settle. Both courts used the Kavanaugh standard, but interpreted
it differently, striking different balances in the wrongful refusal
to settle suit.
ANALYSIS
By refusing to allow the claimant to proceed against the
insurer for excess liability, the Adduci court struck a balance
among the competing interests, giving priority to the insurer's
interest in low settlements. The opposite position was taken by
the Phelan court, which more strongly protected the insured
from the risk of loss resulting from possible excess liability.
Furthermore, the Phelan decision gives the claimant more power
in the settlement negotiations, potentially resulting in higher
settlements than under Adduci.
Adduci Gives Priority to Insurer
The Adduci court created a lesser duty for the insurer to settle
a claim where the Kavanaughfactors of a high probability of an
adverse finding on liability and the likelihood that damages
would greatly exceed coverage exist. The Adduci court held that
the insurer's offer of the policy limits after negotiations had been
terminated was sufficient to relieve it of liability. In so holding,
the court placed little weight on the fact that the time of the offer
was so late that it detracted from its reasonableness.
The Adduci decision subjects the insured to a greater risk of
exposure to excess liability than would a contrary decision.1 1 2
This is so because the insurer has a less stringent duty to settle
where the Kavanaugh test factors have been met. While the
court may have valid reasons for placing a lower duty on the

which the claimant adduced at trial concerning added expenses and the welfare of the
claimant's family showed that it was unreasonable for the insurer to wait until well after
the claimant's offer expired before offering the policy limits. Even though the items being
pleaded were strikingly similar to those being pleaded in Phelan, the Phelan court felt
Adduci was significantly different because Adduci involved pleadings which alleged
insufficient facts to sustain a cause of action. The result was that even though the claimants in both Phelan and Adduci pleaded that they had incurred significant added
expenses by the time the insurer offered the policy limits, the claimant in Phelan was
afforded the opportunity to present evidence at trial while the claimant in Adduci was
not.
112. Any time an action goes to trial the insured is exposed to potential liability.
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insurer, 1 3 -the relative lack of power of the insured in relation to
the insurer, as well as the purpose of insurance, emphasize the
need for a higher duty on the insurer.
The insured has less bargaining power than the insurer in the
original negotiations for the liability insurance contract. The
insured enters into the liability insurance contract seeking to
protect himself from sudden loss. In so doing, he gives up his
right to negotiate or settle the claim. 114 Moreover, it is most often
the insurer who writes the contract. Consequently, when purchasing liability insurance, the insured cannot be expected to
understand the conflicts of interest in the settlement process and
the ramifications that flow from it."1 Furthermore, the insurer is
primarily concerned with commercial gain while the insured is
only trying to protect himself.116 It was in this setting that the
Adduci court utilized the Kavanaugh test and the equal consideration standard to give the insurer more opportunity to expose
the insured to excess liability.
In imposing a lower duty on the insurer, Adduci also gives the
insurer more power in the settlement negotiations with the claimant. The cause of action for wrongful refusal to settle is a weapon that the claimant utilizes in the bargaining setting and is a
factor that the insurer must consider in choosing whether or not
to settle. The Adduci decision allows the insurer to minimize the
possibility of excess liability by making an offer of the policy
limits at a late stage of negotiations."l 7 By making the possibil113. See infra text accompanying notes 123-29.
114. See supranote 1.
115. The standard policy contains provisions that are intended to vest the insurer
with complete control over the litigation. Keeton, supra note 1, at 1137. The policy provisions thus constitute a contract of adhesion, over which the insured has no choice if he
desires to have insurance. 7 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS 29-34 (3d ed. 1963).
116. Trimper v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 540 F. Supp. 1188, 1193 (D.S.C. 1982) (an insured
does not contract to obtain any kind of leverage but only to protect himself from the
spectre of accidental or unavoidable loss); Tibbs v. Great Cent. Inc. Co., 57 Ill. App. 3d
866, 874, 373 N.E.2d 492, 497 (1978) (Moran, J., dissenting) (the insurer-insured relationship is unlike traditional contractual relationships in that the insured does not contract
to secure a particular commercial advantage but rather to protect himself against the risk
of accidental losses).
117. The Adduci court stated that it recognized in some circumstances an insurer's
failure to respond to a settlement demand might constitute a breach of its duty to the
insured, but that since the insurer did make an offer of the policy limits, the insurer was
not liable because claimants showed no reason why it was impossible to accept the offer.
Adduci, 98 Ill. App. 3d at 475, 424 N.E.2d at 649. There is always the possibility, however,
that the insurer will be liable for a breach of its duty to the insured based on factors other
than the timing of the offer. See supra note 60.
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ity of insurer's excess liability unlikely in this situation, the
claimant's incentive to risk going to trial is reduced. By attempting to hold out for the policy limits after a lesser offer, the claimant will incur additional expenses in preparing for trial with little probability of collecting any excess judgment absent a solvent
defendant, thereby gaining little or nothing by waiting. Thus,
the claimant is prompted to settle earlier and for a lower figure.
The effect of Adduci is therefore that the size of settlements will
be diminished, which, in turn, may fail to satisfy the public policy interest of fairly compensating an injured party. 118
The inequities of the bargaining setting greatly favor the
insurer. 119 An insurer, because of its size and vast financial
resources, has the opportunity to dominate negotiations.1 20
Furthermore, these financial resources enable the insurer to
withstand protracted negotiation. The claimant, on the other
hand, needs to settle quickly because he is most often in great
financial distress. 12 1 Moreover, his family may also be financially burdened because of the claimant's medical needs. 22 Delay in settlement works for the insurer, giving it an inherent
advantage in the negotiations for settlement. The Adduci court
allowed the insurer to hold out even longer before making an offer
of the policy limits without being concerned with excess liability.
In so doing, the insurer was given more power than it previously
possessed.
By lowering the insurer's duty to settle a claim, the Adduci
court gave deference to the public's interest in low insurance premiums. 1 23 The Adduci decision virtually took away the threat of
a wrongful refusal to settle suit where the insurer is willing to
make an offer of the policy limits. 24 The decision resulted in less
power to the claimant, which translates to earlier and lower set-

118. See supra note 29.
119. See Note, supra note 34, at 480.
120. Id.
121. Because of court docket congestion, the injured may wait for a long period before
his or her case can even be heard. Since, in the meantime, the claimant may be unable to

work if seriously injured, he or she may be under extreme economic pressure to settle the
claim on any terms available. Corstvet, The Uncompensated Accident and Its Consequences, 3 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 466 (1936); Hogan & Stubbs, The Sociological and
Legal Problem of the UncompensatedMotor Victim, 11 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 12 (1938).
122.

Phelan, 114 Ill. App. 3d at 104, 448 N.E.2d at 584.

123. See supra note 30.
124.

See supra note 117.
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tlements. 125 Lower settlements result in lower payouts by the
insurer, leading to lower costs and lower premiums to the extent
such premiums are passed on to the consumer. Furthermore,
lower insurance premiums may result in more people carrying
insurance, which benefits all. 126 The cost is borne by the insured,
who is liable for any excess damages, and the claimant, who
127
may not be fairly compensated.
The Adduci decision gives priority to the insurer's concern that
if the insurer were subject to excess liability, the claimant would
be able to cut off negotiations upon the insurer's initial, and possibly valid, refusal to settle, in the hope of recovering an excess
judgment.128 Allowing the claimant to constantly threaten the
insurer with a wrongful refusal to settle suit would greatly restrict an insurer's right to ask trial courts to decide any reasonably controversial case. 129 If the claimant is given too much
power, the insurer could be required to settle cases which it otherwise would not, ultimately requiring an increase in insurance
premiums to the public. The Adduci court thought that to give
the claimant the right to reject the insurer's offer of the policy
limits, even at a late stage of negotiations, with an opportunity
to hold the insurer liable for any excess, would result in a balance strongly favoring the insured's interests. Although it would
eliminate the risk of loss to the insured and fulfill the claimant's
need for a larger settlement, it would also detract from the insurer's goal of lower settlements.
Phelan Gives ClaimantMore Power
The Phelan court balanced the competing interests differently
by creating a higher duty for the insurer than the Adduci court
did. The Phelan court placed a greater emphasis on the timing of
the offer by recognizing that the lateness of the offer detracted
from its reasonableness, making it of lesser value to the claimant.
The court in Phelan balanced the interests in such a way that
the interests in protecting the insured from sudden losses out-

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

See supra text accompanying notes 117-18.
See supra note 30.
See supra note 29.
Note, supra note 34, at 480.
See Jarrett, supra note 60, at 63, in which the author emphasizes that the jury in

a wrongful refusal to settle suit considers the fact that one jury has already found the
insured negligent. With this benefit of hindsight, a jury will more than likely to find the
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weighed the societal goal of lowering the cost of insurance. Phelan requires the insurer to offer the policy limits within a reasonable time if the probability of an adverse finding on liability
is great and the amount of probable damages would greatly
exceed the coverage. By placing more emphasis on early settlement in the Kavanaugh test situation, the court makes it more
likely that a claimant will settle for the policy limits, thereby
protecting the insured from any excess liability. In so holding,
the Phelandecision is more in keeping with Illinois' stated policy
of requiring the insurer to consider the interests of the insured in
130
the settlement negotiations.
The insured contracts with the insurer to protect himself from
the risk of sudden loss. In entering the insurance contract, the
insured forfeits all rights to defend or settle the action, thereby
losing control over the decision which subjects him to the risk of
excess judgment. 31 The insurer, on the other hand, has not
undertaken the full share of the risk in deciding to defend rather
than to settle. 132 As the claimant's demand approaches the policy limits, the insurer is not proportionately jeopardized because
it is not risking its own funds by choosing to go to trial rather
than settling. 133 If this is true, the insurer should be liable for
any excess liability because it is subjecting the insured, but not
exposing itself, to risk without any input from the insured. Likewise, if, as in Phelan and Adduci, the insurer waits until a stage
in the settlement process where negotiations have long been
terminated before making an offer of the policy limits, the

unpopular insurance company liable for the excess damages. See also Note, supra note
34, at 480. At an excess liability trial, the insurer is in a poor tactical position. The plaintiff is usually the injured claimant by reason of assignment. The plaintiff is often a
pathetic figure, both because of physical injury and because, if not for the insurer's
attempt to save money by refusing to settle, the injured party would not have to bear the
delay of the second trial and the expense of additional attorney's fees.
130. The insurer must consider the insured's interests in the settlement negotiations.
Adduci, 98 Ill. App. 3d at 475, 424 N.E.2d at 648; Cernocky, 60 Ill. App. 2d at 207, 216
N.E.2d at 204; Scroggins,74 Ill. Ap. 3d at 1029,393 N.E.2d at 720; DeGraw,40 Ill. App. 3d
at 37, 351 N.E.2d at 311; Olympia Fields,325 Ill. App. at 671, 60 N.E.2d at 905.
131. See supra note 1.
132. Rova Farms Resort v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474,483 323 A.2d 495,505
(1974) (when an opportunity for settlement approximates the limits of coverage, the
insurer's exposure to liability is not considerably affected by a verdict in excess of
coverage).
133. Rova Farms, id.; Note, supra note 34, at 479; Comment, Liability of Insurer for
Judgment in Excess of Policy Limits, 48 MICH. L REV. 95, 101 (1949).
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insurer is not jeopardizing its own funds in risking that the
claimant will go to trial. In holding that it is not in good faith for
the insurer to so act, the Phelan court more strongly requires the
insurer to consider the insured's interests. Given that the insurer
has more bargaining power than the insured in the initial insurance contract setting and the fact that the insured has no voice
in the settlement process, the Phelanresult is more equitable. 134
The higher duty placed on the insurer in Phelan gives the
claimant more power in the settlement negotiations with the
insurer. Where the Kavanaugh factors are met, the threat of a
wrongful refusal to settle suit becomes a very real possibility for
an insurer if it waits too long before making an offer of the policy limits. The insurer, upon evaluating the risk of the insured's
liability and the amount of possible damages, must offer the policy limits within the negotiating period. The result of Phelan is
that where the Kavanaughfactors are met, the claimant has the
opportunity to opt for the policy limits at an earlier stage than
under Adduci. In order for the Kavanaugh factors to be met, the
claimant must have damages that will likely exceed policy limits. Thus, the public policy consideration of adequate compensation for injured parties is better realized by requiring earlier settlements in these situations.
Given the inequities of the bargaining power that strongly
favor the insurer, a higher duty on the insurer does not give the
claimant too much power. The insurer is skilled in the evaluation
of claims. It will never be liable for an excess judgment unless
the Kavanaugh requirements are met. Phelan recognized that
delay works for the insurer and that the claimant, under tremendous pressure to settle the claim as quickly as possible, will
not be able to force an insurer, which has large financial resources, to settle in every instance.135 Given that the insurer has the
greater power, it is not desirable to accentuate the imbalance by
increasing the insurer's power.
The Phelan decision, by raising the insurer's duty to settle,
gives priority to the public policy considerations of protection
from sudden loss and adequate compensation to injured parties.
The countervailing public interest of lower premiums is not
given as much weight by the Phelan court. By insisting that the

134.
135.

See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
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Kavanaughfactors be met before requiring the insurer to make a
settlement offer within a reasonable time, however, Phelan does
not allow the claimant to wield so much power that settlements
will become excessive. Furthermore, because the Kavanaugh factors must first be met, the insurer retains the right to go to trial
without automatically risking excess liability. Given these factors, which tend to keep settlements low, the public policy interest in low premiums is not greatly compromised by Phelan.
The Inadequacy of the Kavanaugh Test
As the Adduci and Phelan decisions demonstrate, the Kavanaugh test may be inadequate. The Kavanaugh test does not
consider all of the relevant factors when there is a high probability of an adverse finding on liability and the amount of
probable damages would greatly exceed the coverage. The
Kavanaugh test does not address the issue of the timing of the
insurer's offer. Adduci and Phelan accorded different duties on
the insurer even though the factual situations of the two cases
were very similar. A clearer refinement of the Kavanaugh test is
needed so that courts will be better able to equitably and consistently settle the issues.
Some commentators in other jurisdictions have suggested
imposing a standard that would hold the insurer strictly liable
for any excess judment in order to more adequately protect the
insured's interests. 13 6 Although strict liability may have advantages, 137 it would most likely upset the balance in the negotiations to unduly favor the claimant, ultimately increasing insurance premiums. 38 Furthermore, given the fact that the negli-

136. Such a standard would hold an insurer liable for any judgment in excess of policy limits where the claimant made an offer to settle at or within policy limits. See generally Schwartz, supra note 61; Note, Insurance Company's Duty, supra note 61; Note,
supranote 34; Note, Insurer'sRefusal to Settle, supra note 61; Comment, supra note 61:
137. There are several advantages inherent in a strict liability approach. First, there
is no need for a jury to determine whether the insurer gave equal consideration to its own
interests and the insured's interests. Second, there is no need for the claimant and
insured to jockey for position on the issue of wrongful refusal to settle. Finally, it saves
the time and expense needed to litigate excess liability suits and absolutely protects the
insured. See supra note 136.
138. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. In addition, allowing the claimant
too much power through the use of the wrongful refusal to settle suit may result in high
premiums for low limit policies. If the insurer is liable for the excess in too many cases,
persons seeking insurance may be encouraged to buy low limit policies in the belief that
the insurers will always be liable for the excess. Taken to its logical conclusion, the result
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gence or bad faith standard is firmly entrenched in Illinois, 139 there is very little possibility of a change to a strict
liability standard.
THE PARAMOUNT INTEREST TEST
A much more viable, effective, and consistent manner in
which to protect the interests of the parties would be for Illinois
to adopt the standard that when there is a conflict, the insurer
must make its paramount concern the insured's interests rather
than its own. The current Illinois standard does not give the
insured adequate protection because the court has room to allow
the insurer to proceed in its self-interest even when the Kava141
naugh factors are met. 140 A paramount interests standard
eliminates the ability of the insurer to effectively act in its selfinterest when the Kavanaughfactors are present.
This standard would clarify the situation for Illinois courts.
Since the Kavanaugh test does not address the issue of the timing of the insurer's offer, the Adduci court was able to use it in
conjunction with the equal consideration standard to hold the
insurer not liable. The lateness of the offer detracted from its
reasonableness, making it of lesser value to the claimant.
Assuming Adduci was correct in stating that the insurer gave
the insured's interests equal consideration, its result is inequitable because it does not correctly reflect the fact that the balance of power favors the insurer.1 42 The paramount interest
standard would correct this inequity. If the paramount interest
standard were used with the Adduci facts, the outcome would
change, because the insurer would be required to defer to the
insured's interests and make a strong effort to settle. The paramount interest standard, then, requires the insurer to consider

could be low settlements, because a claimant would accept an offer of the policy limits of
an insolvent insured rather than risking trial, preferring to get some compensation
regardless of the extent of the injuries. See Note, supra note 10.
139. See, e.g., Kavanaugh v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., 35 Ill. App. 3d 350, 342
N.E.2d 116 (1975); Browning v. Heritage Ins. Co., 33 Ill. App. 3d 943, 338 N.E.2d 912
(1975).
140. See supranotes 112-28 and accompanying text.
141. "Paramount interest" in this context means conduct by the insurer in accordance
with its honest judgment after consideration of the facts and giving priority to the interests of the insured before its own. Knobloch v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 46 A.D.2d 278, 279,
362 N.Y.S.2d 492, 506 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974) (Gulotta, P.J., dissenting).
142. See supra notes 68, 112-22, 130-33, and accompanying text.
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more than Kavanaugh because it factors the timing of the offer
into the cause of action.
The Adduci court rejected the paramount interest standard,
stating that such a proposition lacks sound business sense because
it requires the insurer to overlook its own fiscal concerns and
focus on the concerns of its customers. Certainly the insurer's
financial concerns are valid in that increased settlements have
an impact on the public through increased premiums. The paramount interest standard, however, does not require the insurer to
overlook its own fiscal concerns. The paramount interest standard is not a strict liability standard because the insurer still can
risk exposing the insured to excess liability if the probability of
liability is not great and/or the probability of damages in excess
of the policy limits is not high. Furthermore, the paramount
interest standard balances the inequities inherent in the settlement negotiations without giving the claimant too much power,
because the standard would hold the insurer liable only if there
is some wrongful conduct on its part. The insurer can be
threatened with excess liability only if the Kavanaugh factors
are present. Thus, the claimant does not have an inordinate
amount of power and, as a result, settlements and insurance
premiums will remain relatively low.
CONCLUSION

A cause of action for wrongful refusal to settle arises out of the
need to deter an insurer from disregarding the interests of its
insured and the desire to compensate injured parties. Whenever
there is an award for wrongful refusal to settle, it means that
there were damages that could have been avoided at the settlement stage of the lawsuit. The paramount interest test properly
balances the parties' bargaining positions so that the insurer is
encouraged to settle when public policy deems it prudent to do
so. The insured is adequately protected by its liability insurance
policy, the injured claimant gets a prompt and satisfactory settlement, and the public, which eventually bears the cost of insurance, is saved any substantial increase in premiums.
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